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Abstract 
The first part of this paper examines the evolution of the EU in relation to the themes of 
reactive identity formation, a relentless positive integration narrative, the importance of 
opposition within the EU system, and the need for more politics. The second section reviews 
recent historical research showing that consensuality and supranationality have been 
intertwined in constructive complicity since the outset of the European integration process, 
but also how subsequent majority requirements and pernicious electoral arithmetic have 
consolidated this ‘consensus lock’, particularly in the European Parliament. The last section 
concludes that more opposition and politics within the system may be necessary but will not 
of themselves automatically be sufficient to bring about a functioning parliamentary 
democracy at EU level. 
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Introduction: Sections, Themes and Definitions 
 
I have argued elsewhere that the European Union has, through Treaty provisions and 
incremental change, opted consistently and decisively for a parliamentary and party-based 
democratic system, but that a system with such aspects does not, of itself, necessarily lead to a 
‘healthy’ democratic arrangement (Westlake, 2017; Westlake 2019). On the contrary, there are 
plenty of historical examples of systems with such aspects which have proved to be 
dysfunctional and even precarious.  
In this paper, I would like first to examine the proposition that growing Euroscepticism 
is inevitable, necessary, and may even be ‘healthy’. I will further consider the proposition that 
it should be recognised as a natural phenomenon and, in its ‘pure’ form, not ‘demonised’ but, 
rather, brought within the overall system. This proposition may seem an eccentric one for a 
former senior EU official and avowed pro-European to choose. It might indeed seem 
particularly strange and puzzling to be arguing in such a way in the post-Brexit 
referendum/post-Article 50 period. However, I am interested in longer-term, underlying trends 
and where these might lead, and one theme that particularly interests me is possible future party 
systems at European Union level, given that the EU now indeed seems irrevocably set on a 
parliamentary, party-based democratic system. In that context, I have addressed the 
Spitzenkandidaten procedure and the longer-term trends that led to it (Westlake, 2016). As I 
argue in that paper, the Spitzenkandidaten procedure will surely impinge on the future evolution 
of the European Union as a political system. In the two further publications referenced above 
(Westlake, 2017 and 2019), I have speculated about possible future European Union party-
political parliamentary systems and their ‘discontents’.  
In the first section of this paper, I would like to take a closer look at the concept of 
reactive identity formation and then, second, at the possible negative effects in that context of 
a relentlessly positive integration narrative. I would like, third, to examine the importance of 
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opposition within a system, and of an opposition within the EU system, before, lastly, looking 
at some arguments in favour of more disputes, and hence more politics, within and about the 
EU system. In particular, I am going to borrow from four articles/papers whose general 
arguments continue to be overlooked: Hans-Jörg Trenz and Pieter de Wilde, ‘Denouncing 
European Integration: Euroscepticism as reactive identity formation’ (2009); Mark Gilbert, 
‘Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration,’ (2008); 
Peter Mair, ‘Political Opposition and the European Union’ (2007); and Stefan Auer, ‘“New 
Europe”: Between Cosmopolitan Dreams and Nationalist Nightmares’ (2010). 
In the second section of this paper I will look briefly at some recent and as yet 
unpublished research (von Zon, 2018) which shows the way in which, from the very outset of 
the European integration process in the 1950s, consensus has been favoured over politics, with 
disputes being marginalised and opposition muted, excluded or disqualified (van Zon, 2018). 
This process was particularly marked in the European Parliament and its predecessor, the 
ECSC’s Common Assembly, and was largely inherited by the directly-elected European 
Parliament in 1979. As van Zon argues: 
The period between roughly 1954 and 1979 is thus often portrayed as a waiting room, in 
which the Parliament was wholly dependent on the benevolence of the member states for 
small extensions of its competences and, ultimately, elections. In doing so, scholars 
overlook the fact that the first directly-elected MEPs entered an institution with an 
established institutional culture, working routine and self-perception, circumstances they 
built upon with new vigour instead of transforming them altogether (2018, p. 5). 
 
As van Zon’s research shows, consensuality and supranationality were very soon 
intertwined in a sort of constructive complicity. The post-1979 directly-elected Parliament did 
not undo that interrelationship but, rather, consolidated and built upon it, with the requirements 
for centrist consensus subsequently being hard-wired in through treaty- and rules-based 
provisions and also by what I term ‘pernicious electoral arithmetic’.  
The concluding section of this paper will consider the question as to where the EU 
institutions and the EU political system might go from here. It will briefly consider the writings 
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of two political philosophers, David Marquand in the 1970s, and Chantal Mouffe in the 2000s, 
and what their theories might tell us about the EU’s future political system. The paper will 
conclude that bringing politics into the system is perhaps necessary but will not of itself 
necessarily be sufficient to bring about a functioning parliamentary democracy at EU level.1 
Though it is difficult, given current political trends, this paper will seek to maintain a 
definitional distinction between Euroscepticism, populism, and xenophobia. A simple 
definition of terms follows. I have deliberately opted for the simplest definitions, though I am 
of course aware of far more considered reflections about these terms (see, for example, Lecomte 
(2010) and Brack (2018, especially p. 60)): 
- Euroscepticism: ‘opposition to or scepticism of the increasing powers of the European 
Union’; 
- Populism: ‘a political strategy based on a calculated appeal to the interests or prejudices of 
ordinary people’; 
- Xenophobia: ‘fear or contempt of that which is foreign, especially of strangers or people from 
different countries or cultures’. 
For good measure, ‘scepticism’ itself is defined as ‘the view that there is no certain 
knowledge without justification.’ 
From these definitions, it follows that a Eurosceptic need not be a populist nor 
xenophobic. Clearly, a number of political parties have made such an elision, or fusion, of these 
different attitudes (with considerable electoral effect). Such is the case, for example, of the AfD 
in Germany, the French Front National/Rassemblement National, the Lega in Italy, and the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, I 
hope it is still possible to tease ‘Euroscepticism’ as a political phenomenon, away from anti-
                                                          
1 None of the ideas this paper develops are original, nor particularly recent – only the juxtaposition of these 
different arguments is mine. This paper is very much a work in progress – a think piece, designed to encourage 
debate. Any and all criticism would therefore be particularly welcome.  
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immigration, as a political stance (the German CSU, for example, is a pro-European but 
increasingly anti-immigration party). I should perhaps also note that a concern about levels of 
immigration, or of perceived inadequate social integration of immigrants, is not xenophobic – 
or, at least, not necessarily so.2 However, for the purposes of this paper, what I would like to 
get away from is the political argument and populist perception that the European integration 
process and unsustainable levels of immigration are somehow coterminous and that therefore 
to be Eurosceptical is to be anti-immigration and vice versa. 
 
Part One: reactive identity formation, the ever-positive European integration narrative, 
the necessity of opposition, and the need for more politics 
 
Reactive identity formation 
I turn now to the argument that Euroscepticism is inevitable and call ‘in evidence’ the 
arguments of Hans-Jörg Trenz and Pieter de Wilde. Their basic thesis is that the emergence of 
generalised Euroscepticism should not of itself be a matter of concern to pro-integrationists and 
federalists. Euroscepticism, they argue, is a ‘natural’ by-product of European integration – it is 
a reactive phenomenon. The more there is of ‘Europe’, the more there is to react against. ‘The 
existing body of literature on Euroscepticism,’ they argue: 
is often biased contrasting European values and normative positions on European 
integration against the alleged Eurosceptic threat. This has sometimes resulted in strong 
evaluative statements on the aggressive nature of Euroscepticism that corrodes the 
European project or even predicts the end of European integration (p. 1). 
 
Instead, they propose that: 
Euroscepticism should rather be understood as a discursive formation in the making. As 
such, Euroscepticism is part of the general dynamics of contesting and justifying European 
integration… The assessment of the worth of European integration rather takes place 
through narratives and counter-narratives, which claim belonging and demarcate the 
boundaries of the emerging European social and political space (p. 2). 
                                                          
2 Philippe Legrain (2007, 2015, 2017, 2018) to take one example, has consistently mounted a powerful economic 
and cultural case in favour of intra-European immigration and immigration more generally. 
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Euroscepticism has…: 
opened new spaces of popular democracy against imposed unification, in which different 
actors compete with expressions of popular sovereignty and differentiated claims of 
belonging (p. 18). 
 
Thus, polity contestation of the European Union is, they argue, intrinsically linked to 
the new salience of identity politics in Europe. This ‘objective’ or ‘empirical’ approach lies 
outside the normative framework that would see, say, the avoidance of a war as a ‘good’. 
Euroscepticism is, rather, the refusal of other and the assertion of self. The more there is of the 
other, the more there is assertion of self.3 Euroscepticism is a kind of contestation that (barring 
anarchical theory) is only possible in the absence of polity consensus (see the second section in 
this paper on the EU’s ‘enforced’ consensus). The unfinished nature of the European Union, 
argue Trenz and de Wilde, makes Euroscepticism ‘possible and expectable’ (p. 6). Were the 
Union to find an end state, whatever that might be, there would, sooner or later, be generalised 
acceptance of that end state. Euroscepticism is, therefore, reactive identity formation. They 
conclude: 
We should not simply discard Euroscepticism as being irrational, emotional or marginal. 
Euroscepticism is not something to be solved or to be overcome by better or more rational 
ways of communicating with the public. It is something that will remain prominent for as 
long as the European Union seeks to consolidate its future (p. 18). 
 
In effect, Euroscepticism is inevitable (‘expectable’). I would like, briefly, to push this 
argument a little bit further by posing a hypothetical question: have pro-integrationists 
misunderstood the nature of Euroscepticism? In particular, have they been wrong to see 
Eurosceptics as somehow being ‘the enemy’?4 By refusing to recognise Euroscepticism as a 
legitimate phenomenon, and by refusing to enter into debate about the relative merits or de-
                                                          
3 Charles De Gaulle captured the essence of the idea when he declared that ‘One needs adversaries to exist’ (though 
the quotation might be apocryphal, alas). 
4 See Petr Kaniok (2012) for a development of this theme. Fitzgibbon et al (2017) meanwhile bring together a 
collection of analyses about the emergence of Euroscepticism beyond domestic politics and hence as a trans-
national phenomenon.  
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merits of ‘more’ or ‘less’ Europe, have the pro-integrationists pushed it beyond the pale of 
respectability, in particular to where the twin temptations of populism and xenophobia lie – that 
is, the anti-immigration arguments that are currently bearing far greater electoral fruit than the 
first populist wave of anti-single currency arguments? 
To argue, as passionate federalists tend to, that the only legitimate position for a patriotic 
EU citizen is to favour unconditionally further integration immediately places Eurosceptics 
beyond the pale in a way which frequently generates resentment. Why, it might be asked, should 
federalists automatically occupy the moral high ground, especially given that many 
Eurosceptics are internationalists who favour a different form of cooperation which is no less 
legitimate from a moral point of view? To characterize Eurosceptics as reactionary nationalists 
might generate good copy among the faithful but also, Trenz and de Wilde argue, generates 
reactive identity formation.  
 
The ever-positive European integration narrative 
I’d like to turn briefly now to Mark Gilbert’s thesis. ‘Underlying scholarship on the EU’, 
he argues: 
is the conviction that the institutions of the EU are the outcome of a historical process 
whereby national institutions are being superseded and replaced by supranational ones (p. 
641). 
 
Gilbert criticizes this tendency, for two reasons: 
First, … the progressive conception has led to the story of the EU being told in over-
simplified and unhistorical ways. Second, … the progressive conception has blinded 
authors to the possibility that alternative narratives of European integration are possible 
and that these may come to predominate if the European project loses its aura of success 
(p. 641).5 
 
                                                          
5 And for a fascinating examination of the way in which the EU integration process has effectively ‘appropriated’ 
to its own exclusive narrative all of Europe’s successes, thus obscuring other integration and cooperation processes, 
see Patel (2013). 
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Gilbert argues that much writing on the history of European integration is characterized 
by ‘certain common rhetorical devices’: 
a) choice of terms: construction metaphors abound. References to Europe’s ‘path’, ‘march’, 
‘advance’, ‘progress’ are also commonplace. Moments of relative inactivity are described 
as ‘stagnation’ ... The process is nevertheless always ‘re-launched’ or ‘revived’ after 
moments of difficulty. In general, narratives personify the process, turning it into a creature 
with a vital life of its own that enables it to overcome ‘setbacks’ – to mention another 
commonly-employed word. 
b) authorial judgements: the standard used to measure whether major decisions were 
successes or failures is almost always whether they augmented or reduced the overall 
degree of supranationality within the Community. …it is a general rule that orthodox 
historiography uses approving language to describe increases in supranationalism but 
employs words like ‘limited’, ‘minor’, ‘tinkering’, ‘piecemeal’ and so on whenever 
relatively few gains were made for the principle of supranationality (p. 645). 
 
Of course, vocabulary always matters, but Gilbert’s point is that ‘academic concepts and 
narratives shape the perceptions of politicians and hence influence their actions.’ (p. 659): 
… the seeming reluctance … to understand that there is popular discontent with the 
democratic deficit in Europe and that the EU is widely regarded as a big part of a wider 
problem of disenfranchisement and disempowerment, has surely been influenced by the 
boundless faith in the resilience of the European project that is a common theme in all the 
narratives I have been discussing (p. 659). 
 
Returning briefly to the concept of ‘reactive identity formation’, could it be that, by 
adhering to this progressive narrative, pro-integrationists have further consolidated the 
impression of relentless progress which, in turn, has confirmed Euroscepticism in its reactive 
stance?6  
 
The necessity of opposition 
I turn now to the argument that opposition (Euroscepticism) is necessary, and here I am 
admittedly straying onto slightly more normative territory. In his 2007 article Peter Mair 
stressed something which, once understood, is blindingly obvious: both government and 
                                                          
6 The sort of implied relentless that enabled Boris Johnson, when declaring his position in favour of ‘Brexit’ before 
the 2016 referendum, to argue that the European Union was a project that had ‘basically being going on for 
decades, which I think is in real danger of getting out of proper democratic control.’ (Guardian, 21 February 2016) 
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opposition are important to democracy. At the European Union level there is no government, 
and hence there can be no opposition. The EU could be described as a ‘polity without politics’ 
(see Vivien Schmidt, 2016, for a detailed treatment of this theme). Membership of the European 
Commission, the closest thing to an executive, does strangely apolitical things to its members.7 
(In that context, the so-called ‘politicization’ of the current European Commission would seem 
to be a misnomer.) 
Echoing the analyses of Robert A. Dahl (1965, 1966), Mair distinguished between three 
different types, or modes, of opposition. Classic opposition is the concept with which we are 
most familiar. Those not in government oppose by offering alternatives to the policies pursued 
by the government, whilst at the same time recognising and respecting the right of the 
government to govern. Secondly, there is opposition of principle, in which those opposed to the 
government object not only to the government and its policies but to the whole system of 
governance. In other words, they oppose the government and refuse to acknowledge its 
legitimacy. Third, there is what Dahl called the elimination of opposition. This is government 
by cartel, when there are no longer any substantive or meaningful differences between parties 
and the only opposition left is against personalities. There is, in Dahl’s terms, a ‘surplus of 
consensus’ (1965, p. 19. I shall return to that term in the second section below). 
The three modes of opposition are inter-related. The more space there is for classic 
opposition, the less there is for opposition in principle, and of course there can be no cartel. 
However, as Mair points out, ‘if political actors lack the opportunity to develop classical 
opposition, then they either submit entirely, leading to the elimination of opposition, or they 
revolt.’ He concludes: 
                                                          
7 In that context I frequently cite the cases of Martin Bangemann and Karel Van Miert in the Santer Commission. 
The former, a liberal in tooth and claw, busied himself building an industrial policy, whilst the latter, a socialist 
Commissioner with responsibility for competition policy, effectively busied himself overseeing deregulation. 
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Once we cannot organize opposition in the EU, we are then almost forced to organise 
opposition to the EU. To be critical of the policies promulgated by Brussels is therefore to 
be critical of the polity; to object to the process is therefore to object to the product… In 
other words, we either submit, and hence we accept the elimination of opposition, or we 
mobilize an opposition of principle and become intrinsically Eurosceptic (2007, p. 7). 
 
Mair further (and presciently) argued that this development is ‘beginning to reach down 
into the domestic sphere, in that the growing weight of the EU, and its indirect impact on 
national politics, also helps to foster democratic deficits, and hence also limits the scope for 
classical opposition at the national level’ (2007, p. 15). Mair went on to develop his analysis, 
but I would like to leave his primary argument there, hanging in the air; because there can be 
no opposition to a government, there is growing opposition to the system.8  
 
The need for more politics 
I come now to the article by Stefan Auer in which he seeks ‘to expose some limitations 
of dominant discourses about European integration.’ (2010, p. 1163) Auer argued:  
The attempt to move towards a more federalist Europe underpinned by the ideal of ‘post-
national citizenship’ (Habermas) is both unrealistic and undesirable. The populism and 
ethno-centric nationalism endangering the European project emerged in Europe not despite 
the cosmopolitan agendas of its elites, but arguably, in response to their ambitious agendas. 
A more realistic view on nationalism is imperative for a better understanding of European 
integration; one capable of addressing the appeal of populist politics. (Ibid., p. 1163) 
 
Although Auer seeks to consider the phenomenon of growing populism in Eastern 
Europe and the new Member States in particular, he asks himself the rhetorical question as to 
why populist politics is so popular in Europe, ‘both east and west.’ He seeks to address a key 
aspect of the issue by ‘exposing the limitations of dominant discourses of the post-1989 project 
of European unity as formulated in the west.’ He seeks to demonstrate that:  
                                                          
8 In effect, Mair’s thesis was a re-working of Albert O’Hirschman’s classic 1970 text, Exit, Voice and Loyalty:  
Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. Mair’s posthumously-published Ruling the Void: The 
Hollowing of Western Democracy took his arguments still further, but the simple essential theory is that the voter 
either puts up, or shuts up, or seeks to leave. Christopher Bickerton has recently taken Mair’s general thesis and 
applied it more generally to what he describes as being an ‘over-constitutionalized’ EU (Bickerton, 2018, p. 11) 
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the attempts to move towards a more federalist Europe – whether ‘The United States of 
Europe’ (Habermas, 2008), or a ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ (Beck, 2006), both underpinned by 
the ideal of ‘post-national citizenship’ (Habermas, 2001) – are both unrealistic and 
undesirable. National electorates resist this move whenever they can. Whether we like it or 
not, ‘nations matter’ in Europe (Calhoun, 2007). A more realistic view on nationalism is 
imperative for a better understanding of European integration, one capable of addressing 
the appeal of populist politics. It is unhelpful to wish away people’s concerns for national 
sovereignty, just as it is implausible to return to a Europe of six, nine or 12 Member States 
(whether that construct is called ‘Core Europe’, ‘Old Europe’ or ‘Avante-Garde Europe’) 
(p. 1164). 
 
Auer pleads ‘for a Europe that accepts nationhoods, a Europe comfortable with a vast 
variety of political cultures’ (ibid). 
Like Gilbert, Auer considers also the theme of competing narratives and what he terms 
‘the politics of memory in Europe’ (2010, p. 1175). Auer observes that the times of the 
permissive consensus about integration are gone: ‘The initial method of European unification, 
in which enlightened elites pursued ambitious integrationist projects on the assumption that 
‘ordinary people’ would eventually appreciate their advantages, no longer applies’ (2010, p. 
1179). His contention is that enthusiasts of the European Union, owing partly to their distorted 
views of Europe’s past and their unrealistic expectations about its future, may well be 
contributing ‘to the demise of the very Europe they favour: 
A Europe of 27 or more Member States is, by necessity, more heterogeneous, diverse and 
difficult to govern. However, it is important to stop seeing this as a burden to overcome. It 
should be seen as an opportunity: more disputes bring on more politics (2010, p. 1179). 
 
But Auer does not advocate ‘confrontation and strife in Europe.’ (Ibid., p. 1180) Instead, 
he calls for a more realistic view of European politics that is based on the insight that politics 
is fundamentally about dealing with conflicts. He argues that this is also the way in which the 
‘New Europe’ can further shape Europe’s future. Europe’s citizens will not become engaged if 
there is consensus or, worse, silence. Rather, ‘Europe needs to engage its citizens by making its 
polity more political: 
That is, by opening it to fierce political contestation about its aims, and the ways in which 
best to achieve them. The peoples of Europe need to be presented with different choices 
about the future of Europe. This is why elites in the ‘Old Europe’ need to overcome their 
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fear of the New Europe and embrace the conflictual nature of politics in a Europe to come 
(2010, p. 1180). 
 
It is time, in other words, for the EU institutions, and perhaps particularly the European 
Parliament, to overcome what might be termed ‘the consensus lock’, but can they?9 
 
  
                                                          
9 Van Middelaar (2015) has argued that the eurozone crisis and Russian interference in Ukraine at last brought a 
form of politics to the EU, by demonstrating to Europeans why government (and not just governance) was 
necessary. However, he went on to argue that, ‘EU integration, after ‘permissive consensus’ and ‘constraining 
dissensus’ could be moving to the era of binding dissensus.’ (p. 1) The theorists examined in the first section of 
this paper would argue that such ‘binding dissensus’ is far from the sort of ‘proper politics’ that the EU ideally 
requires.  
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Part Two: the ‘consensus lock’, its historical origins, consolidation and pernicious 
electoral arithmetic 
 
Historical origins 
Through his historical research, Van Zon (2018) convincingly demonstrates how many 
of the distinctive traits of today’s directly-elected European Parliament can be traced all the 
way back to the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community. Space 
precludes a lengthy treatment of his findings, but in the following paragraphs I shall consider 
some of the more noteworthy.  
A first aspect is that Common Assembly members were, to a considerable degree, self-
selecting and like-minded. In the first place, they were delegated from national parliaments, so 
those that got appointed tended to be those that were interested in furthering the integration 
process and were prepared to make sacrifices, in terms of time and travel, to do so. This was 
even more the case given that over half of the 78 members of the Common Assembly were 
already seated in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (something the member 
states had expressed a preference for in a protocol to the Treaty of Paris). Thus, over half the 
first members of the Common Assembly sat in three different assemblies. Understandably, a 
great deal of what would now be called ‘socialisation’ occurred. This was further facilitated by 
the considerable preponderance of lawyers and constitutionalists among the original 
membership.  
A second aspect is that membership of the Common Assembly was exclusive, rather 
than representative, with an emphasis on shared values. Thus, despite their significant 
representation in Italy and France, the Italian and French Communist Parties were excluded (or, 
rather, simply not nominated), expressly because of their anti-system views and opposition to 
European integration in particular. The Italian Socialist Party which, under Pietro Nenni’s 
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leadership, collaborated closely with the Communist Party, was also excluded. And despite 
winning 52 seats in the 1956 French elections, Pierre Poujade’s Union et fraternité française 
was similarly denied representation. The deliberate exclusion of such parties further encouraged 
consensualism among those parties that were represented: ‘What remained was a contingent of 
internationally-oriented and moderate politicians’ (von Zon, 2018, p. 12). 
A third aspect is that members of the Common Assembly very rapidly came to consider 
their institution as being supranational. They were encouraged in this by Jean Monnet, the first 
president of the ‘main’ supranational body, the High Authority. At the first plenary session of 
the Assembly on 11 September 1952, he declared:  
The Members of the High Authority have taken on the solemn commitment not to accept 
or demand instructions and to refrain from any act that is incompatible with the supra-
national character of their mandate. Your task has the same character. In the exercise of 
your Office, you are representatives of the entire community. 
 
This not only created a feeling of solidarity between the two supranational institutions 
in the Community, but also led Members of the Assembly to see themselves as representing the 
European citizen, as opposed to national citizens. But such citizens were a concept, not a reality, 
which in turn led the members to exercise a benign but patrician form of representation – this 
was more than Burkean, since no electorate had expressly entrusted them with the task. As van 
Middelaar put it, the “Strasbourgers spoke on behalf of ideal citizens who did not exist, with an 
expectation both that such citizens would emerge and that they themselves, as educators, could 
help achieve this” (2013, p. 278).  
A fourth aspect is that political groups were rapidly formed and became the chief actors 
within the Assembly, with budgets and secretariats and, in the nature of the institution: ‘Where 
political groups took a common stance, they invariably took a European stance’ (von Zon, 2018, 
p. 11). This, in turn, put great emphasis on conformism and the suppression, or at the least the 
muffling, of dissension. When, as rarely occurred, the Socialist Group couldn’t agree with the 
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Christian Democrats, for example, its members abstained or left the chamber, rather than 
expressly voting against. 
A fifth aspect is that, whether in the constitutional, political or consultative domains, the 
Assembly created working mechanisms (Committees, rapporteurs) that immediately militated 
in favour of compromise and consensus and the garnering of the maximum number of votes, 
on the understanding that the institution’s voice was strongest when a maximum of its members 
voted in favour of a position or a proposal. As van Zon puts it, ‘Unanimity was thought to be a 
stronger expression of their representative function than dissension’ (2018, p. 28). From the 
outset, therefore, the Assembly denied itself politics in favour of the furthering of its 
institutional ambitions. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Assembly’s work on direct 
elections. There was a tacit acceptance that the Assembly would have to give voters strong 
reasons to turn out, because otherwise ‘bad Europeans’ could be elected by default. As van Zon 
notes, ‘One working group member characterised communist voters as being very disciplined 
and having strong convictions, the two very factors most MEPs feared most ordinary Europeans 
were lacking when it came to European elections’ (2018, p. 60). 
As van Zon goes on to document, by the time direct elections finally came along in 
1979, the die had long since been cast. Far from starting with a tabula rasa, the first directly-
elected Parliament effectively continued in the direction that had been set back in the 1950s, 
consolidating the delegated Parliament’s fundamentally consensual and centrist working 
methods. 
 
Consolidation (treaty- and rules-based provisions) 
The first and most demanding Treaty-based provision for majority voting was the 
original Article 144 in the Treaty of Rome (taken over almost word-for-word from the Treaty 
of Paris), regarding the censure motion. To wield this power – something the Parliament has 
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never managed to do – it must muster ‘a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing a 
majority of the members of the Assembly’. When, in the 1970s, the Parliament first gained 
significant budgetary powers (1970, 1975, 1977), these were counter-balanced by various 
majority requirements (absolute majorities, and three-fifths or two-thirds of the votes cast). In 
a similar vein, when the Parliament was first granted legislative powers under the Single 
European Act (1986), these were counter-balanced by absolute majority requirements 
(Westlake, 1994, pp. 199-201). And the same trend has continued with many of the additional 
powers that the Parliament has won through treaty change.  
At the same time, though, the Parliament has, through its rule-making autonomy, 
imposed significant additional majority requirements upon itself, in part on the basis of the old 
logic that the Parliament, as an institution, is always strongest when it can muster the most 
possible votes in favour of a position or a proposal. However, as the next section shows, such 
absolute majority requirements have also further consolidated and strengthened the ‘consensus 
lock’, because absolute majorities (not to mention the even bigger majorities required in the 
budgetary context) are only possible through some sort of coordinated voting between the two 
main groups, the S&D and the EPP. This pernicious electoral arithmetic further precludes the 
sort of adversarial politics that characterises so many of the national parliaments in the Member 
States.  
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Pernicious electoral arithmetic 
 
Table 1: the ‘consensus lock’ and pernicious electoral arithmetic 
 
Year S&D ALDE EPP Total 
EP 
seats 
Abs. 
majority 
Total 
three 
parties 
As 
%age 
of 
total 
EP 
seats 
S&D 
plus 
EPP 
As 
%age 
of 
total 
EP 
seats 
1979 113 40 107 410 206 260 63.4 220 53.6 
1984 130 31 110 434 218 271 62.4 240 55.2 
1989 180 49 121 518 260 350 67.5 301 58.1 
1994 198 43 157 567 284 398 70.1 355 62.6 
1999 180 50 233 626 314 463 73.9 413 65.9 
2004 200 88 268 732 367 556 75.9 468 63.9 
2009 184 84 265 736 369 533 72.4 449 61.0 
2014 191 64 214 751 376 469 62.4 405 53.9 
 
Table 1 shows the number of seats won by the three main centre parties that have been 
represented in the European Parliament since 1979 (and, indeed, since 1952). Several 
observations are in order. The first is that no single party/group has ever come close to winning 
an absolute majority on its own. In other words, a coalition of some sort has always been 
necessary. The second is that the most viable coalition, in terms of consistently generating more 
than the absolute majority in key parliamentary votes, has invariably been a centrist one 
(meaning EPP plus S&D).10 This, in turn, has invariably led to more-or less explicit position-
sharing agreements between these two parties/groups, almost invariably with the full mandate 
being split into two halves and shared. Thus, of the sixteen presidencies of the Parliament to 
date, seven have been EPP and six have been S&D, and the three exceptions (Simone Veil, 
Liberal, 1979-1982, Henry Plumb, British Conservative, 1987-1989, and Pat Cox, Liberal, 
2002-2004) were immediately followed by a reversion to form and alternance between the two 
                                                          
10 The socialist/social democrat group in the Parliament has undergone several name changes. I refer to it here 
throughout by its current title, Socialists & Democrats, or S&D.  
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main groups (the EPP and S&D respectively). The third observation is that, since a 2004 high, 
the centrist coalition has been in relative electoral decline. There are various reasons for this – 
more member states, more parties, the rise of Euroscepticism, and so on – but the effect on the 
centrist coalition is, almost paradoxically, to consolidate and reinforce it. Last but not least, 
since 1979, this pernicious electoral arithmetic, especially when taken together with majority 
requirements, means that alternance in power, as a function of elections (as opposed to 
consensual power-sharing agreements), has never been possible. Thus, not only was the old, 
pre-1979 consensus lock inherited and consolidated by the directly-elected Parliament, but 
pernicious electoral arithmetic has further consolidated it.  
Of course, the ‘consensus lock’, as I have described it is not just about the European 
Parliament. The European Commission (still a college and one that very rarely votes and is now 
explicitly dependent on a centrist coalition in the Parliament) and the Council and Coreper, with 
their deeply ingrained tradition of finding the broadest possible agreement (ideally, unanimity), 
have played their part. Indeed, Heather Grabbé has memorably described the European Union 
as having become ‘one vast consensus-generating machine’ (2016). Referring back to the 
discussion in Section one, Mair and Auer would argue that such a system effectively denies 
politics and produces (Dahl’s term) a ‘surplus of consensus.’ 
So where might the European Union institutions go from here? 
The European Union has increasingly locked itself into a version of party-political 
parliamentary democracy, based on the following aspects (Westlake, 2017, 2019): 
- A parliament periodically elected by universal suffrage; 
- An embryonic executive held to account by the parliament; 
- Embryonic political parties at union level (though supported by public 
funding rather than membership contributions); 
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- An electoral linkage between the (results of the?)11 elections and the 
leadership/composition of the embryonic executive (the Spitzen-
kandidaten procedure). 
 
This process has occurred against a general backdrop characterised by the following 
developments: 
- The relative decline of parliaments; 
- The decline of deferential societies and mass membership political 
parties; 
- Decreasing electoral participation in general and turnout in European 
elections in particular (Kopf, 2017); 
- Decreasing support for mainstream traditional political parties; 
- The rise of Eurosceptical, populist and anti-system parties; 
 
In addition, the EU’s chosen model of party-political parliamentary democracy, with its 
implicit assumptions about clear alternatives and alternance in power, has been badly 
undermined by several further developments: 
- An emphasis on consensus within and among the EU’s supranational 
institutions – above all, the Commission and the Parliament; 
- The evolution of mechanisms to encourage and consolidate consensus, 
including Treaty-based and rules-based majority requirements; 
- Tendencies to exclude or marginalise non-consensual forces; 
- Pernicious electoral arithmetic increasingly forcing the main, already 
consensual party groupings into more-or-less explicit coalitions. 
                                                          
11 On the mysterious and unexplained differences in wording of the various language versions of the Lisbon 
Treaty’s Article 9D, see Westlake, 2016, pp. 39-40. 
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The May 2019 European elections are still a few months away, but recent opinion 
polling would seem to suggest that many of the trends identified above are going to continue. 
Politico’s poll of polls, downloaded on 2 January 2019 (Politico, 2019), strongly suggests that, 
in a post-Brexit Parliament, the only viable potential coalition would be some sort of agreement 
between the European People’s Party, the Socialists & Democrats, and the Alliance of Liberals 
and Democrats for Europe, with the latter (especially if the projected 20 MEPs of Emmanuel 
Macron’s La Republique En Marche! party aligns with it) playing the role of ‘king-maker’. And 
even such a coalition risks being only marginally viable. As Table 2 shows, a left-green 
coalition would fall 57 votes short, and a so-called ‘Jamaica’ coalition would fall 54 votes short. 
As the opinion polls currently stand, only a centrist coalition of the EPP, ALDE and the S&D 
would muster a comfortable working majority. Of course, these calculations need to be taken 
with a big pinch of salt. The left might win more seats,12 or it might win less. Some groups 
might dissolve and/or reform. The Eurosceptical parties might do better, or worse.  New parties 
could pick off seats (the Politico poll of polls gives them 39 seats). But the pernicious centrist 
arithmetic is still very much present.  
  
                                                          
12 The Economist has recently speculated about big gains for the left (‘Breaking point 2010,’ The Economist, 7 
July 2018, p. 6), though this seems somewhat tongue-in-cheek. 
20 
 
Table 2: possible coalitions in the 2019-2024 (post-Brexit) European Parliament 
Note: an absolute majority would require 353 votes in the 705-seat Parliament 
A centre-left coalition: European United Left (53) plus Socialists & Democrats (130) plus 
Greens/European Free Alliance (44) plus Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (69) 
= 296 (57 votes short of a majority) 
A ‘Jamaica’ coalition: European People’s Party (186) plus Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe (69) plus Greens/European Free Alliance (44) = 299 (54 votes short of a majority) 
A centre-right coalition: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (69) plus European 
People’s Party (186) = 284 (100 votes short of a majority) 
A right/Eurosceptic coalition: European Conservatives and Reformists (49) plus Europe of 
Freedom and Democracy (44) plus Europe of Nations and Freedom (63) = 156 (197 votes short 
of a majority) 
A grand centrist coalition: European People’s Party (186) plus Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (69) plus Socialists & Democrats (130) = 385 (32 votes beyond a 
majority) 
 
Supposing such a grand centrist coalition were to come into being in June/July 2019, 
what might then occur? The logic of the Spitzenkandidaten procedure and of those who are 
determined to make it stick will almost certainly lead the European Council to nominate an EPP 
candidate proposed by the European Parliament (since the EPP will be the largest grouping in 
the new Parliament) – Manfred Weber. But the EPP will not have been able to propose such a 
candidate alone; rather, it will have been the result of an agreement between the three groups 
forming the coalition. The logic of the situation will almost certainly lead to a traditional 
‘package deal’ of appointments. If the EPP ‘takes’ the Commission, then the S&D Group 
(assuming it comes second) could claim the Presidency of the European Council, and the ALDE 
Group could claim the position of High Representative and Commission Vice-President, for 
example (or vice-versa, depending on their relative numerical strength). Other high positions 
could and probably would come into play, in particular, the presidency of the Parliament itself 
(and the presidencies of the groups), and the presidency of the European Central Bank – if that 
has not already been decided. Such a package deal would almost certainly involve other 
traditional considerations, such as gender, nationality, and north-south/east-west and 
larger/smaller member state.  
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Such a grand centrist coalition is, it should be pointed out, among the best possible 
outcomes of the May 2019 European elections. It is possible, if not currently probable, that not 
even such a grand centrist coalition will be viable (if the European People’s Party and the 
Socialists & Democrats do worse than the polls currently predict, for example). Under those 
circumstances, there are two probable alternative scenarios. One would be an attempt to bring 
the Greens and/or the European United Left into the centrist coalition. Presumably, no similar 
gesture could be made towards the Eurosceptical/populist right. The other scenario would 
therefore be a failure to rally a viable majority, which would spell chaos for the whole system, 
since the Parliament would not be able to amass the necessary majorities to approve the 
proposed President of the Commission, the proposed High Representative and subsequently the 
proposed College of Commissioners. History suggests that the European Union’s actors will do 
all that they can to avoid such a chaotic or anarchic situation, with all that it would imply for 
the budgetary and legislative procedures and the politics of the Union. In short, under either the 
best or the worst scenario, in terms of the relative electoral performances of the party-political 
groupings, the most probable outcome will be some sort of grand centrist coalition.  
In 1871 the then-British poet laureate Alfred Austin is reported to have written a 
notoriously poor poem, ‘On the illness of the Prince of Wales’, with a modernistic nod to the 
then-new technology of the telegram. The poem concluded, ‘O’er the wires the electric message 
came,/He is no better, he is much the same.’ If anything like the speculative scenarios sketched 
out in this section comes to pass, then the European voter will be entitled to ask what, if 
anything, has changed, or is everything much the same? For the European Union will once 
again have proved itself to be, in Grabbé’s memorable words, ‘one vast consensus-generating 
machine’ and will risk continuing to be perceived as a technocratic, centrist, elitist organisation 
in which, as was the case from the 1950s onwards, government is for the people, but not by 
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them and in which any opinion other than the ‘right’ opinion is marginalised by the centrist 
consensus.  
The European Union and its institutions cannot now go back on some seventy years of 
history and evolution. But if the theses considered in this paper are valid, then the increasingly 
urgent challenge is how to bring more politics into the system, as a way of avoiding ever greater 
anti-system forces. Can the EU’s institutions, and particularly its Parliament, find a way to 
overcome the consensus lock without critical destabilization? Can political groupings at the 
level of the European Parliament give Europeans a sense of different policy options, not just 
within the system but about the system and the way it develops? For, if potential voters do not 
feel that their vote will make any difference (Mair described it as ‘this evident evasion of 
opposition in Europe’ (2007, p. 12)), then they will either not vote, or they will vote for those 
who promise, in one way or another, to change the system – or even to destroy it.  
Perhaps it is time to revisit Chantal Mouffe’s seminal work, On the Political (2005), 
more aptly entitled, in the French translation, L’Illusion du Consensus (2016). In effect, the 
sociological concept of reactive identity formation is part of the post-structural realisation that 
identity is always relational or, put another way, if there is an ‘us’ there will always be a ‘them’. 
As Mouffe argues, the challenge is how to avoid the constantly present possibility of violent 
conflict, what she calls ‘antagonism’ (2005, pp. 15-16). Politics, Mouffe further argues, is 
defined as the collective practices through which order is nevertheless created. The challenge 
and the trick for democratic politics, she declares, is to cast the ‘us/them’ relationship in such a 
way that antagonism is transformed into ‘agonism’. The antagonistic is not eradicated but is 
sublimated as a plurality of ideological conflicts that are given legitimate forms of expression 
within a shared symbolic space (p.20); a space that, in the context of this paper, latter day 
commentators refer to as ‘the common European space’. For Mouffe, a parliamentary system 
facilitates partisan conflict, which is a regulated form of identity politics within the system. 
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However, the sine qua non for such a parliamentary system to work is for there to be effective 
choice and convincing distinctions, and for voters, in effect, to be able to be ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
within the system.13 The trick of the populists and the Eurosceptics has been to paint the system 
as being ‘them’, even though they are, necessarily, a part of it.14  
What would such an ‘us/them’ cleavage look like within the EU system? It is surely not 
the traditional left/right cleavage that has been of declining relevance for some time – and even, 
as Stein Rokkan argued already in the 1950s, since before the Second World War. Nor can it 
be, if Mouffe’s analysis is correct, the current centrist consensual bloc (which, as we have seen 
in, is steadily shrinking), surrounded by the arguably unpalatable or the unacceptable, excluded 
through the rules-based system.  
In 1979 the British political philosopher and commentator David Marquand (1979) 
wrote a forward-looking analysis of the European Parliament on the eve of the first direct 
elections. He speculated about a ‘Party Europe’ and predicted that, ultimately, a nationalist-
supra-nationalist system would evolve. This evolution would not be quick or tidy and would 
probably overlap ‘in a puzzling and superficially illogical way’ (p. 126) with the existing left-
right system. However, what was under discussion was ‘the possible emergence of a system 
appropriate to a continent’ (p. 126, my emphasis). 
Marquand argued that analogies with existing state systems were misleading. Rather, 
the right analogy was with United States’ party politics in the 1830s and 1840s. Then, the 
American Whigs and Democrats were: 
                                                          
13 Although Noam Chomsky has cynically observed, “The smart way to keep people passive and obedient is to 
strictly limit the spectrum of acceptable opinion but allow very lively debate within that spectrum.” (Chomsky, 
1998, p. 43) 
14 Indeed, Nigel Farage has happily gone on the record about how UKIP could not possibly have developed its 
electoral force in the UK electoral context if it had not had access to resources at EU level (Farage, 2014). Those 
resources were not just financial: the European Parliament’s own communication services provided UKIP with 
the clips that would later appear on You Tube, with Farage, for example, notoriously declaring that Herman Van 
Rompuy, the then-President of the European Council, had ‘the charisma of a damp rag and the appearance of a 
low-grade bank clerk’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bypLwI5AQvY&vl=en ) or, more recently, ‘high 
fiving’ with Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, in the European Parliament’s 
chamber (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iy391W-A108 ). 
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loose coalitions of state parties, which usually operated at the state level, but which came 
together once every four years to contest presidential elections. They were held together, 
to the extent that they were held together at all, by their views on federal questions. Their 
views on state questions were often not merely different but opposed (Marquand, 1979, p. 
125). 
  
Though Marquand acknowledged that the American analogy could not be pushed too 
far, he insisted that it was a useful backdrop. Seen against it, ‘the divisions within the nationalist 
and supra-nationalist camps in present-day Europe are neither particularly surprising nor 
particularly deep’ (1979, p. 126).  
As I have written elsewhere,  
Are we not witnessing Marquand’s prediction gradually becoming a reality? It is neither 
quick nor tidy, but maybe, just maybe, Europe’s pro-integration parties – whatever their 
ideological divides in the domestic political context – are increasingly engaging in loose 
political coalitions at the EU level. The questions then arise; what will face them, or what 
should face them? (Westlake, 2017, p. 27) 
 
The ‘elision’ I referred to in the introduction between Euroscepticism, populism, and 
varying degrees of xenophobia (or, at the more acceptable level of the spectrum, anti-
immigration stances), makes these awkward questions to ask at the moment, although research 
(for example, Vasilopoulu, 2017) confirms that there are many varieties of party-based 
Euroscepticism, not all of them necessarily of extreme, far-right, or xenophobic stance or 
tendency. In any case, for the time being, Eurosceptic forces within the European Parliament 
are fragmented and spread across a number of different groupings that, notwithstanding Steve 
Bannon’s sweet attentions, are unable to merge their views and interests sufficiently to form 
any sort of coherent opposition.15 However, their numbers did grow significantly in the May 
2014 European elections (Dye, 2015), and the Spitzenkandidaten procedure might just in the 
                                                          
15 However, two sister papers at the Bath UACES Conference demonstrated how Eurosceptic MEPs are becoming 
increasingly coherent practitioners within the EP system, notwithstanding the various obstacles put in their way: 
Beim and Brack, 2018, and Ripoll Servant and Panning, 2018. 
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future (2024? 2029?) give such parties a potential rallying point to enhance their cohesion, even 
if it remains a loose electoral coalition.16  
Such a scenario is pure speculation, but it does give rise to some further awkward 
questions. Would such an opposition within the system be desirable? Or would the ‘elision’ 
referred to above put such an opposition beyond the pale in a way that, say, the Italian 
Communist Party was excluded from government in Italy? At the same time, perhaps the rise 
of a more coherent opposition of some sort will oblige the current ‘governing coalition’ to 
organise itself more effectively in order to maintain its oligopolistic hold on power. In which 
case, might the Union not end up with a continental version of Giovanni Sartori’s ‘polarized 
pluralism’ (see, e.g., Hanning, 1984)? By analogy, could a future Union17 find itself with a 
loose but dominant governing bloc on the pro-European, pro-integration end of the spectrum 
and a smaller anti-integration, anti-immigration bloc to its right, condemned by the perceived 
extremism of its views, never to be ‘allowed’ into governance but nevertheless being of 
sufficient weight and importance to act as a constantly destabilizing element within the system? 
In other words, internalising opposition by itself may be necessary, but the sort of party-political 
system that evolves thereafter is an equally important consideration.  
To conclude, in this paper I have explored the argument that Euroscepticism may be 
regarded as reactive identity formation and therefore a natural by-product of the integration 
                                                          
16 But, as I have argued elsewhere, “Whichever it is, we should not allow the centre ground of European politics 
to be dragged to the unsavoury right. We should recognise that there is a respectable strain of Euroscepticism, a 
strain that deserves to be taken seriously, that deserves to be engaged in open and informed debate, and not 
dismissed as eccentricity or opportunistic populism. It may, for all we know, be an emerging form of loyal 
opposition. We must help it to peel itself away from the unsavoury extremes and to remain true to the European 
Union’s attachment to ‘the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person’ and ‘the principles of liberty, 
democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ that are enshrined in the preamble to the 
Lisbon Treaty. We must insist not only on clarity of discourse on issues such as immigration and asylum, but also 
try to make the positive case… This isn’t easy. Immigration is an awkward issue on the doorstep. But the concerns 
for which immigration is all too often a proxy need to be thrashed out through informed political discourse. We 
need to explore and address people’s fears, not agree with them. Above all, I believe that Ban Ki-Moon is right. 
We have been a model for the world and I fervently believe that we should remain one.” (Westlake, 2010)  
17 This paper assumes there will be a future Union though, of course, there is a burgeoning speculative literature 
about the EU’s demise, supposedly provoked, in one way or another, by immigration (for example, Gillingham 
(2018), Krastev (2017), Murray (2017), Thompson (2018), The Economist (2018)). 
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process; the ‘more Europe’ there is, the more reason there is to react and the more there is to 
react against. I have further explored the argument that the vocabulary and the analyses of pro-
integrationists, in their search for positive narratives, have perhaps created the impression of a 
relentless or inevitable process which has in itself exacerbated such identity reactivity. I have 
subsequently considered how, in effect, the growing strength of opposition to the integration 
process is a measure of the process’s success – or its perceived success, and not its failure. And 
I have considered the argument that consensus – the European Union’s natural (and very 
effective) mode of politics until now – might be a ‘bad thing’, inasmuch as such a ‘surplus of 
consensus’ is a denial of politics, and that disputes, meaning more politics, might actually be a 
‘good thing.’ I have considered how the absence of a formal opposition within the EU system 
might be as important as the absence of a formal government, which leads to the question of 
how the European Union might allow for more opposition within the system, since the absence 
could, and almost certainly will, otherwise lead to increasing opposition to the system itself. 
Beyond that, though, there lurk further questions; in particular, what sort of opposition, and 
what sort of party political system?  
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